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A realistic Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol necessarily deals with finite resources,
such as the number of signals exchanged by the two parties. We derive a bound on the secret key
rate which is expressed as an optimization problem over Re´nyi entropies. Under the assumption of
collective attacks by an eavesdropper, a computable estimate of our bound for the six-state protocol
is provided. This bound leads to improved key rates in comparison to previous results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for
transmitting a secret key between two partners. Since
its initial proposal [1] QKD has reached maturity through
many theoretical developments and experimental realiza-
tions. Moreover, in the last few years QKD has entered
the commercial market [2] and small QKD networks were
realized [3, 4].
A significant figure of merit in QKD is the secret key
rate, i.e. the ratio between the length of the secure key
and the initial number of signals. There is a big difference
between the key rate calculated under the assumption
that the key is composed of an infinite number of bits,
and a key in real applications, where the number of bits
is finite. In recent years a new paradigm for security
in the finite key setting was developed [5–8]. However,
the complexity of the entropic quantities involved in the
formalism only permits to find bounds on the optimal
quantities, which leads to much lower key rates for a small
number of signals with respect to the asymptotic ones.
To our knowledge the first work dealing with finite
key corrections is [9]. The currently used framework
for finite-key analysis was developed in [6, 7]. The
bound proved in [7] was used by T. Meyer et al. [10]
to calculate the key rate in the finite-key scenario. In
[11, 12] security bounds for the BB84 and the six-state
protocol were provided using an easily calculable bound
for the smooth min-entropy. Recently, many efforts
were done for improving the bounds on the secret key
rates for a finite amount of resources, e.g. using the
connection between the min-entropy and the guessing
probability [13, 14]. So far the secret key rates provided
are only proven to be secure for collective attacks. A
possible approach for providing security against coherent
attacks using the results against collective attacks can
be obtained by post-selections techniques [15–17] or the
exponential de Finetti theorem [6]. A recent technique
is given by uncertainty relations for the smooth min-
entropy [18, 19]. This last approach is very promising
because it provides an easily calculable tight bound on
the key rate even for coherent attacks, however it is not
easily applicable to the six-state protocol. A step in the
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direction of considering more practical issues in addition
to finite-key corrections (BB84 with and without decoy
states and entanglement-based implementations) was
provided in [20, 21].
In this paper, we present a bound on the achiev-
able key length for the six-state protocol. The presented
bound is resorted from [7, Lemma 9], where it is used
for bounding the key length in terms of smooth Re´nyi
entropies. We calculate explicitly the presented bound
under the assumptions of collective attacks and the
depolarizing channel. The calculated key rates lead for
small number of signals to better key rates than the
bounds derived in [10–12].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we present the protocol we are going to study. In
Section III we introduce definitions and our notation.
In Section IV we explain the approach developed in this
paper and we show how to estimate the proposed bound
for the achievable key rate. In Section V we compare
the proposed bound with other relevant bounds present
in the literature. Section VI contains the conclusions. In
the appendices we prove additional results used in the
paper.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
In this paper we consider the entanglement-based ver-
sion of the six-state protocol [22, 23]. The protocol con-
sists of the following steps.
State preparation and distribution: Alice pre-
pares N entangled Bell states and distributes one part
of each pair to Bob. We assume that Eve performs at
most a collective attack, i.e. the adversary acts on each
of the signals independently and identically.
Reduction to Bell-diagonal form: Alice and Bob
apply randomly and simultaneously one of the opera-
tors {1l, σX , σY , σZ} and as a result they obtain a Bell-
diagonal state the entries of which are directly connected
with the Quantum Bit Error Rates (QBER), [24] and
Appendix C.
Sifting and Measurement: Alice and Bob measure
at random one of the three Pauli operators. The Pauli
operators are chosen with different probabilities. We con-
2sider that σX and σY are chosen with the same proba-
bility and that σZ is chosen such that Pr(σZ) ≥ Pr(σX).
This biased setting [25] is advantageous in terms of sift-
ing. At the end of the measurement process, Alice
and Bob broadcast the choice of the bases through the
classical channel and discard the results coming from
a different choice of the measurement basis. We call
n′ = n′X +n
′
Y +n
′
Z the length of the sifted key shared by
Alice and Bob, where n′i with i = X,Y, Z is the remain-
ing number of signals when both Alice and Bob measure
σX , σY , σZ .
Parameter estimation: Parameter estimation (PE)
permits to measure the amount of errors on the key,
which in the security analysis are assumed to be intro-
duced via Eve’s eavesdropping. In the six-state proto-
col three bases are used for the measurement and there-
fore a QBER in each direction is calculated by Alice and
Bob. Practically speaking, Alice broadcasts for each ba-
sis mi < n
′
i bits of the sifted key on the classical channel.
Bob compares these outcomes with his corresponding
outcomes and calculates the QBERs eim as the ratio be-
tween the number of discordant positions and the length
of the transmitted strings. In general eXm 6= eYm 6= eXm.
For calculating explicitly the bound that we are going to
propose we use the biggest QBER as measured QBER,
denoted as em. Note that it is possible to introduce
additional symmetrizations [26, 27] that reduce the ini-
tial state to a state described by only one parameter:
the QBER. However those symmetrizations require ad-
ditional experimental means that could be difficult to
implement.
The remaining n := n′ − mX − mY − mZ bits will
be used for the extraction of the key. The QBER e is
bounded by parameter estimation developed in [11, 12,
14, 20]. The parameter εPE represents the probability
that we underestimated the real QBER.
The QBER of the key e with probability 1 − εPE is
such that[11, 12, 14, 20]
e ≤ em + 2ζ (εPE ,m) (1)
with
ζ(εPE ,m) :=
√√√√ ln( 1εPE
)
+ 2 ln (m+ 1)
8m
. (2)
Error correction: Alice and Bob hold correlated
classical bit strings Xn and Y n. The purpose of an error
correction (EC) protocol is to create a fully correlated
string, while leaking only a small amount of information
to an adversary. In the following, we will consider realis-
tic error correction protocols. The number of bits leaked
during the classical communication to an eavesdropper is
given by [11, 20]
leakEC = fECnh(e) + log
(
2
εEC
)
, (3)
where fEC & 1 depends on the used EC protocol, h(e)
is the binary Shannon entropy, i.e. h(e) = −e log e −
(1 − e) log (1− e) and e is the QBER. Here, εEC is the
probability that Alice’s and Bob’s strings differ after the
error correction step.
Privacy amplification: Let Alice and Bob hold a
perfectly correlated bit string Xn, on which Eve might
have some information. The purpose of privacy amplifi-
cation is to shrink the length of Xn in order to reduce
Eve’s information on the resulting string.
Practically, Alice chooses at random a two-universal
hash function (Definition B.1 in Appendix B) and com-
municates it to Bob.
III. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
The set of quantum states, which are normalized
positive semidefinite bounded operators, will be repre-
sented by S (H), where H stands for a finite-dimensional
Hilbert space. In the following ρA(ρB) belongs to the
set of bounded operators which act on the Hilbert space
HA(HB). For a given state ρAB, the states ρA, ρB are
defined via the partial trace, i.e. ρA := trB ρAB and
ρB := trA ρAB.
In this paper, we will consider Re´nyi entropies, which
are a generalization of the Von Neumann entropy.
Definition III.1. (Re´nyi entropies[7, 28]) Let α ∈ R ∪
{∞} and ρ, σ ∈ S (H). The Re´nyi entropy of order α is
defined as 1
Sα (ρ) :=
1
1− α log (tr (ρ
α)). (4)
In particular, we get
S0 (ρ) = log (rank(ρ)) (5)
S2 (ρ) = − log
(
tr(ρ2)
)
(6)
S∞ (ρ) = − log (λmax (ρ)) (7)
where λmax (ρ) is the maximal eigenvalue of ρ.
Another useful quantity is the smooth Re´nyi entropy,
which is the Re´nyi entropy optimized on a set of operators
which are ε-close to the operator involved in the actual
computation. We define an ε-environment via the trace-
distance in the following way [7]:
Definition III.2. (ε-environment) Let ε ≥ 0 and ρ ∈
S (H), then
Bε (ρ) :=
{
σ ∈ S (H) : 1
2
||σ − ρ||1 ≤ ε
}
(8)
where ||A||1 = tr
√
AA†.
1 log := log2
3Definition III.3. The smooth Re´nyi entropy of order α
is defined (following [7]) as
Sεα (ρ) :=
1
1− α infσ∈B ε2 (ρ)
log (tr (σα)). (9)
The main result presented in this paper will be
expressed as an optimization problem on a classical-
quantum ε-environment of a certain operator.
Definition III.4. (Classical-quantum(cq)-state) Let
{|x〉} be an orthonormal basis of HX and moreover let
HA be a generic Hilbert space. We define the state ρXA
which is classical onHX and quantum onHA as the state
ρXA =
∑
x
PX(x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ρxA,
where ρxA ∈ S(HA) and PX(x) is a classical probability
distribution.
Finally, we define the classical-quantum ε-environment
as the space
Bεcq (ρXA) := {σXA ∈ Bε (ρXA) :
σXA =
∑
x
PX(x) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ σxA},
where σxA ∈ S(HA) and PX(x) is a classical probability
distribution. Finally, we recall the composable definition
of security introduced by Renner in [7]. For additional
details see [29].
Definition III.5. Let ρKE be the cq-state describing
the classical key K of length ℓ, distilled at the end of a
QKD protocol, correlated with the quantum states of the
eavesdropper ρE . The state ρKE is said to be ε-secure if
1
2
‖ρKE − 1
2ℓ
1l⊗ ρE′‖1 ≤ ε, (10)
where ρE′ is the quantum state of an eavesdropper not
correlated with the key.
In the literature several bounds on an ε-secure key
length [6, 7, 30] were presented.
IV. BOUND ON THE ACHIEVABLE KEY
LENGTH
The following bound was inspired by [7, Theorem 4]
where it was used as a bridge for providing an analogous
bound in terms of smooth Re´nyi entropies.
Theorem IV.1. Let ρXnEn be the cq-state describing
Alice’s bitstring Xn as well as Eve’s quantum informa-
tion represented by ρEn. Let ε, εPA ≥ 0. If the length ℓ
of the key is such that
ℓ ≤ sup
σXnEn∈B
ε
2
cq (ρXnEn )
(S2 (σXnEn)− S0 (σEn))
− leakEC + 2 log (2εPA) , (11)
then the key is ε+ εPA-secure.
Sketch of Proof: In the following we give an idea of the
proof which follows the lines of [6, 7]. For all details see
Appendix B. We first prove that ℓ can be chosen such
that
ℓ ≤ sup
σXnEnC∈B
ε
2 (ρXnEnC)
(S2 (σXnEnC)− S0 (σEnC))+
+ 2 log (2εPA) , (12)
where the additional random variable C is associated
with the probability distribution of transcripts of the EC
protocol. Then we will ”extract” the leakage term using
the data processing inequality and the subadditivity of
the Re´nyi entropies.
The bound in Eq. (11) is related to the bound calcu-
lated in [10] because it involves optimizations on Re´nyi
entropies. However, in [10] the two Re´nyi entropies are
optimized independently and here we have a combined
optimization problem. This additional constraint is mit-
igated by the fact that in our bound we optimize over a
bigger environment than the one used in [10], more pre-
cisely ε′ = ε
2
2 where ε
′ is the environment used for the
smooth Re´nyi entropies in [10].
A. Lower bound of Theorem IV.1 using smooth
Re´nyi entropies
In this section, we present a lower bound for the key
length presented in Theorem IV.1. The optimization
problem involved in equation Eq. (11) is exponentially
complex because the dimension of the involved operators
scales with n, that is the length of the string used for
extracting the key. For reducing the complexity of the
problem we consider the symmetric six-state protocol.
For this protocol the number of different eigenvalues in
ρ⊗nXE scales polynomially with n [10], therefore as done
in [10], it is possible to concentrate on optimizing the
eigenvalue distribution of σXnEn . However it is not clear
how to find the eigenvalue distribution of σEn from the
one of σXnEn in such a way that it is possible to per-
form computations for big n. In the following we present
a lower bound on Theorem IV.1 expressed in terms of
the smooth Re´nyi entropy of order zero and a modified
smooth Re´nyi entropy of order two that we will denote as
S
ε
2(ρ
⊗n
XE). This last entropy permits to bound the eigen-
values of σEn for a given σXnEn . From the numerical
point of view the deviation from Sε2(ρ
⊗n
XE) is negligible.
1. Modified Smooth Re´nyi entropy of order two
Let ρ⊗nXE be the operator describing Alice’s classical
string of n bits correlated with the operator ρ⊗nE held
by Eve. The operator ρ⊗nXE is constructed by a direct
sum of 2n blocks which have the same eigenvalues (see
Appendix C for additional details).
4Definition IV.2. The modified smooth Re´nyi entropy
of order two of the operator ρ⊗nXE is defined by
S
ε
2(ρ
⊗n
XE) := S2(τXnEn), (13)
where the operator τXnEn has the following properties:
1. τXnEn has the following form
τXnEn :=
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉 〈x| ⊗ τxEn , (14)
where {|x〉} is the basis in which ρ⊗nXE is a classical-
quantum state (Definition III.4). Moreover each of
the {τxEn} has the same eigenvalues and the depen-
dence on x is manifested only in the eigenvectors
(See Eq. (D4) for a more formal statement).
2. Let {Λi}i=0,...,n+1 be the set of differing eigenval-
ues of one block of the operator ρ⊗nXE in increasing
order; i.e. Λi < Λi+1 and let {mi}i=0,...,n+1 be the
set of multiplicities such that mi is the multiplicity
of Λi. Let {µi}i=0,...,n+1 be the eigenvalues of one
block of τXnEn in increasing order with respective
multiplicity {ni}i=0,...,n+1. Let
s+r :=
r∑
i=1
mn−i+2(Λn−i+2 − Λn−r+1), (15)
(16)
for 0 ≤ r ≤ n+ 1.
The eigenvalues of τXnEn are defined by the follow-
ing relations

µi :=


Λ+ n+ 1− b+ ≤ i ≤ n+ 1
Λi 1 ≤ i ≤ n− b+
ε
2m0
i = 0
ni = mi 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1,
(17)
where
b+ := max{r : s+r ≤
ε
2
} (18)
and
Λ+ := Λn−b++1 −
ε
2 − sb+∑b+
i=0mn−i+1
. (19)
Since the smoothing in the smooth Re´nyi entropy of
order two is realized by taking the maximum in the envi-
ronment, it follows for any operator σXnEn ∈ B ε2 (ρ⊗nXE)
Sε2(ρ
⊗n
XE) ≥ S2(σXnEn).
Therefore, if we can prove that the operator τXnEn in-
troduced before is such that τXnEn ∈ B ε2 (ρ⊗nXE), then we
have proven that the modified smooth Re´nyi entropy is
a lower bound for the smooth Re´nyi entropy.
Proposition IV.3. The operator τXnEn defined by its
eigenvalues in Eq. (17) is such that 12‖τXnEn−ρ⊗nXE‖ = ε2 ,
i.e., τXnEn ∈ B ε2 (ρ⊗nXE).
Proof. The proof follows by the direct calculation of the
distance using the spectral decomposition of ρ⊗nXE .
For the six-state protocol for n = 104, it turns out
that2 |Sε2(ρ⊗nXE) − Sε2(ρ⊗nXE)|/Sε2(ρ⊗nXE) ∝ 10−5390 for a
QBER = 5% and ε = 10−16. Moreover, for increas-
ing n the difference becomes smaller. The reason of this
similarity is that the dimension of the kernel of ρ⊗nXE is
much bigger than the degeneracy of the support, namely
m0 = 2
2n− 2n vs∑i6=0mi = 2n, therefore there is, prac-
tically, no difference between the eigenvalue distribution
in Eq. (17) and the optimal eigenvalue distribution for
Sε2(ρ
⊗n
XE) presented in [10].
2. Computable lower bound for the achievable key length
The following theorem provides the bound that we are
going to exploit in this paper.
Theorem IV.4. Let ρ⊗nXE be the cq-state describing the
classical string shared by Alice and Bob and the correlated
quantum state of the eavesdropper. Then
sup
σXnEn∈B
ε¯
2
cq (ρ⊗nXE)
[S2(σXnEn)− S0(σEn)] ≥
S
ε−εˆ
2 (ρ
⊗n
XE)− S εˆ0(ρ⊗nE + δ¯En)− εˆ
with δ¯En =
εˆ
22n+1 1lEn and 0 ≤ εˆ ≤ ε.
Proof. In order to provide a lower bound, it is enough
to choose an operator in B
ε¯
2
cq(ρ
⊗n
XE) and to calculate
the difference between the Re´nyi entropies of the cho-
sen operator. In Appendix D we construct an operator
ηXnEn ∈ B
ε¯
2
cq(ρ
⊗n
XE) such that the following two inequali-
ties hold:
S2(ηXnEn) ≥ Sε−εˆ2 (ρ⊗nXE)− εˆ (20)
and
S0(ηEn) ≤ S εˆ0(ρ⊗nE + δ¯En), (21)
where δ¯En =
εˆ
22n+1 1lEn .
Using these two inequalities, we have
sup
σXnEn∈B
ε¯
2
cq(ρ
⊗n
XE
)
[S2(σXnEn)− S0(σEn)] ≥ (22)
S2(ηXnEn)− S0(ηEn) ≥ (23)
S
ε−εˆ
2 (ρ
⊗n
XE)− S εˆ0(ρ⊗nE + δ¯En)− εˆ. (24)
2 The high precision used in this calculation is obtained using an
arbitrary precision computer program (See Section V).
5Remark IV.5. Numerical calculations indicate that the
choice εˆ = ε2 is optimal for a wide range of used param-
eters.
Remark IV.6. The bound provided in Theorem IV.4
may not be asymptotically optimal. However, the em-
phasis is for finite-key analysis and the bound permits to
improve the key rate for experimentally relevant number
of signals. Note that although we can have small dif-
ferences in the asymptotic case, the bound is, from the
numerical point of view, pretty tight. In fact, note that
(see Definition III.3)
sup
σXnEn∈B
ε¯
2
cq(ρ⊗nXE)
[S2(σXnEn)− S0(σEn)]
≤Sε2(ρ⊗nXE)− Sε0(ρ⊗nE ).
Calculating the difference between the upper bound
and the lower bound, it is for small n (n ≈ 104) of the
order of 0.1% and it decreases for larger n.
V. RESULTS
The security is characterized by the parameter ε, rep-
resenting the acceptable probability of failure of the ex-
ecution of the protocol. In the following we consider a
standard setting with ε = 10−9. For the simulations we
assume that n′X = n
′
Y and we take for parameter esti-
mation mX = mY = mZ = n
′
X . The length of the string
used for the extraction of the key is n = n′Z −mZ which
has at most QBER e = em+2ζ(εPE,mZ) with probabil-
ity 1 − εPE (see Eq. (1)). The error correction protocol
performs such that in Eq. (3) we have fEC = 1.2 and
εEC = 10
−10 ([12], Eq. (3)). Finally, we optimize the
free parameters (εPE , ε, εPA,Pr(σX),n) in order to max-
imize the key rate.
The algorithms for the calculations were implemented
using C++. The library CNL (Class Library for Numbers)
[31] was used to perform calculations with arbitrary pre-
cision. Due to the non-smoothness of the involved func-
tions, we used the Hybrid Optimization Parallel Search
PACKage HOPSPACK [32], which permits to deal with
all involved optimizations in an efficient way and permits
to perform the calculations on a cluster.
In the following we summarize the three bounds for the
achievable secret key rate that we are going to compare.
Bound proposed in this paper
The following proposition summarizes our results of
Section IV.
Proposition V.1. Let ρ⊗nXE be the cq-state describing the
classical string shared by Alice and Bob which is corre-
lated with the quantum state of the eavesdropper. Let N
be the initial number of quantum states shared by Alice
and Bob, n be the length of the string used for extract-
ing the key which has QBER e = em+2ζ(εPE ,mZ) with
probability 1− εPE. Then Alice and Bob can achieve the
secret key rate
r :=
n
N
[
S
ε¯
2
2 (ρ
⊗n
XE)− S
ε¯
2
0 (ρ
⊗n
E + δ¯En)− ε− leakEC
]
e=em+2ζ
+ 2 log (2εPA) , (25)
where ε = εPE + εPA + ε+ εEC.
Proof. Using Theorem IV.1, Theorem IV.4 and Re-
mark IV.5 the result follows.
Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) bound
The conditional smooth min-entropy [6] characterizes
the optimal secret key rate [6, 18]. The AEP bound used
in [12, 14] comes from the AEP approximation [6, 33] of
the conditional smooth min-entropy. Collective attacks
allow us to bound the smooth min-entropy of a product
state by the conditional von Neumann entropy of a single
state [11, 14]
rAEP :=
n
N
[
H(X |E)ρ − 5
√
log(2/ε)
n
− leakEC
]
e=em+2ζ
+ 2 log (2εPA) , (26)
with H(X |E)ρ = (1− e)
[
1− h
(
1− 3
2
e
1−e
)]
.
Smooth Re´nyi entropy bound
This bound was derived in [7] and calculated in [10]
and is given by
rSRE :=
n
N
[
Sε
′
2
(
ρ⊗nXE
)− Sε′0 (ρ⊗nE )− leakEC]
e=em+2ζ
+ 2 log (2εPA) , (27)
where ε′ = ε
2
2 .
A. Robustness of the protocol
An important figure of merit is the threshold QBER
which characterizes the minimal N for a fixed QBER per-
mitting to extract a positive key rate. As shown in Fig. 1,
with the bound presented in this paper it is possible to
have a positive key rate with 23% signals less than the
smooth Re´nyi entropy bound and 50% signals less than
the AEP approach, for a QBER of 1%.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Minimal number of signals versus
QBER permitting to extract a non-zero key rate. Compari-
son between the bound presented in this article r (black solid
line), see Eq. (25), the smooth Re´nyi entropy bound rSRE
(blue dashed line), see Eq. (27) and the AEP bound rAEP
(red dot-dashed line), see Eq. (26).
B. Secret key rates
In Fig. 2, we compare the secret key rates calculated
by the three approaches for various QBERs. The bound
developed in this paper leads to significant higher key
rates when limited resources are used. In particular when
QBER = 1% with the bound presented in this paper
with N ≈ 5 · 104, it is possible to have non-zero key
rates. Instead with the other approaches it is necessary
to use N ≈ 6.5 · 104 for the smooth Re´nyi entropy bound
and N ≈ 105 for the AEP bound.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Key rate versus log
10
(N) where N is
the initial number of quantum systems shared by Alice and
Bob. Comparison between the bound presented in this article
r (black solid line), see Eq. (25), the smooth Re´nyi entropy
bound rSRE (blue dashed line), see Eq. (27) and the AEP
bound rAEP (red dot-dashed line), see Eq. (26).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Although optimal bounds for the finite-key scenario
are provided in the literature they are not calculable and
were so far only estimated by bounds coming from the
asymptotic equipartition theorem (see [14, 19] for two ex-
ceptions). In this paper we resumed the smooth Re´nyi
entropy bound [10] and we proved that this bound is
tighter than the AEP bound. Our main contribution
is a new bound on the maximal achievable secret key
length which involves optimizations on Re´nyi entropies.
With respect to [10] the main advantage is that we use
a bigger environment for the optimizations and with re-
spect to [11, 12] we don’t use bounds coming from cor-
rections to the asymptotic case. As a result we were able
to obtain higher secret key rates with respect to [10–12].
For calculating the quantities involved in our analysis we
need the quantum channel to be symmetric. Although we
don’t have any guarantee that Alice and Bob share such
a channel, it is possible for them to reduce to this case
employing additional symmetries3 or taking as QBER of
a symmetric channel the worst one of a non-symmetric
channel.
Finally, regarding future work, note that here we con-
sidered an ideal protocol where the signals entering in
Alice and Bob’s laboratory are qubits and where the mea-
surement devices are perfect. All this assumptions could
be relaxed following the analysis done in [20, 24].
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Appendix A: Properties of Re´nyi entropies
The following properties and their proofs can be found
in [5] and [34].
Lemma A.1 (Data processing). Let ε, ε′ ≥ 0 and
ρXBC ∈ S
(HX ⊗HB ⊗HC) be a classical-quantum
state, i.e. ρXBC =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB ⊗ ρxC . Then
with S2 (ρXC |X) := infx∈X S2 (ρXC |x), the following in-
equality holds
Sε+ε
′
2 (ρXBC) ≥ Sε
′
2 (ρXC) + S
ε
2 (ρXB|X) . (A1)
3 Actually, in this case it also possible to redefine the protocol
removing the sifting following the construction presented in [27].
The key rate will be higher but the relative differences between
the three approaches remain the same.
7Lemma A.2 (Subadditivity). Let ε ≥ 0, ε′ ≥ 0 and
ρAB ∈ S
(HA ⊗HB), then
Sε+ε
′
0 (ρAB) ≥ Sε0 (ρA) + Sε
′
0 (ρB) . (A2)
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem IV.1
Before we start with the proof, we define some quan-
tities used in the following.
Definition B.1. (Two-universal hash functions[35]) Let
F be a family of functions from X to Z and let PF be a
probability distribution on F . The pair (F , PF) is called
two-universal if Pf [f(x) = f(x
′)] ≤ 1|Z| for any distinct
x, x′ ∈ X and f chosen at random from F according to
the distribution PF.
The following definition involves the leakage of infor-
mation during the error correction protocol.
Definition B.2. The number of bits leaked to an eaves-
dropper during the error correction protocol is [6]
leakEC := log |C| − inf
xn∈X
S∞
(
PC|Xn=xn
)
, (B1)
where |C| is the cardinality of the set C containing all
possible communication transcripts and PC|Xn=xn is the
probability that there is a specific communication tran-
script when Alice has a specific xn.
Note that in the definition Bob is missing because we
consider a one-way error correction protocol.
Moreover, let us recall a result proven in [7] and used
in the following proof.
Theorem B.3. [7] Let ρXnEnC be a cq-state describ-
ing Alice’s bitstring Xn, Eve’s quantum system and the
distribution of error correction transcripts C. Let F be a
two-universal family of hash function from Xn → {0, 1}ℓ.
Then
1
2
‖ρF (Xn)ℓElCF−ρU ⊗ ρEℓCF ‖1
≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(S2(ρXnEnC)−S0(ρEnC)−ℓ)
(B2)
where ρF (Xn)ℓEℓCF :=
∑
f∈F PF(f)ρf(Xn)ℓEℓC ⊗ |f〉〈f |
and ρU =
1
2ℓ 1l.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem IV.1.
Proof. (Theorem IV.1) At the end of the QKD protocol,
the classical string obtained from privacy amplification
correlated with Eve’s information is
ρF (Xn)ℓEℓCF :=
∑
f∈F
PF(f)ρf(Xn)ℓEℓC ⊗ |f〉〈f |.
Let ρ′
F (Xn)ℓEℓCF ∈ B
ε
2
(
ρF (Xn)ℓEℓCF
)
be the operator
that maximizes the right-hand side of Eq. (B2). Because
the trace-distance does not increase applying the partial
trace, it follows that ρ′
EℓCF
∈ B ε2 (ρEℓCF ). Let us define
ρU =
1
2ℓ
1l. Then,
1
2
∣∣∣∣ρF (Xn)ℓEℓCF − ρU ⊗ ρEℓCF ∣∣∣∣1
=
1
2
‖ρF (Xn)ℓEℓCF − ρ′F (Xn)ℓEℓCF
+ρ′F (Xn)ℓEℓCF − ρU ⊗ ρ′EℓCF
−ρU ⊗ ρEℓCF + ρU ⊗ ρ′EℓCF ‖1 (B3)
≤ 2ε
2
+
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρ′F (Xn)ℓEℓCF − ρU ⊗ ρ′EℓCF ∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
(B4)
≤ ε+ 1
2
2
− 1
2
(
sup
σXnEnC∈B
ε
2 (ρXnEnC)
[S2(σXnEnC)−S0(σEnC)]−ℓ
)
.
In the step from Eq. (B3) to Eq. (B4) we used the tri-
angle inequality and the fact that the maximal possible
distance is ε2 . The last inequality follows from Eq. (B2)
and the definition of ρ′
F (Xn)ℓEℓCF . Requiring that the
distilled key is (ε+ εPA)-secure, i.e.
ε+
1
2
2
− 1
2
(
sup
σXnEnC∈B
ε
2 (ρXnEnC)
[S2(σXnEnC)−S0(σEnC)]−ℓ
)
!≤ ε+ εPA,
the proof of Eq. (12) is completed.
Regarding the leakage term, note that in order to apply
Lemma A.1 of Appendix A for bounding S2 (σXnEnC) we
restrict the optimization space to B
ε
2
cq (ρXnEnC). There-
fore,
sup
σXnEnC∈B
ε
2 (ρXnEnC)
(S2 (σXnEnC)− S0 (σEnC)) ≥
sup
σXnEnC∈B
ε
2
cq(ρXnEnC)
(S2 (σXnEnC)− S0 (σEnC)).
Using Lemma A.1 of Appendix A with ε = ε′ = 0, it
follows that
S2 (σXnEnC) ≥ S2 (σXnEn) + S2(σXnC |Xn). (B5)
By definition
S2(σXnC |Xn) := inf
xn∈X
S2
(
PC|Xn=xn
)
(B6)
≥ inf
xn∈X
S∞
(
PC|Xn=xn
)
. (B7)
Moreover, using Lemma A.2 with ε = ε′ = 0 we obtain
S0 (σEnC) ≥ S0 (σEn) + S0 (σC) . (B8)
Putting together the last four equations and Defini-
tion B.2 the proof is concluded.
8Appendix C: The operator ρXE
The Bell-diagonal state shared by Alice and Bob after
the use of the depolarizing map is
ρAB = λ1
∣∣ψ+〉 〈ψ+∣∣+ λ2 ∣∣ψ−〉 〈ψ−∣∣
+ λ3
∣∣φ+〉 〈φ+∣∣+ λ4 ∣∣φ−〉 〈φ−∣∣ ,
where the states {|ψ±〉 , |φ±〉} are the Bell states and∑
i λi = 1.
For the symmetric six-state protocol
λ0 =
1
2
(2 − 3e), λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = e
2
, (C1)
where e is the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER).
The operator ρABE is defined as the purification of
ρAB. Tracing out Bob and measuring Alice’s system, we
get the operator ρ⊗nXE describing the classical string X
n
held by Alice and Bob and Eve’s quantum systems ρ⊗nE .
In general
ρ⊗nXE :=
(
ρ0E ⊕ ρ1E
)⊗n
, (C2)
with
ρ0E :=


λ0
√
λ0λ1 0 0√
λ0λ1 λ1 0 0
0 0 λ2
√
λ2λ3
0 0
√
λ2λ3 λ3

 , (C3)
ρ1E :=


λ0 −
√
λ0λ1 0 0
−√λ0λ1 λ1 0 0
0 0 λ2 −
√
λ2λ3
0 0 −√λ2λ3 λ3

 .
(C4)
Diagonalizing the operators above, we find that they
have the same eigenvalues but different eigenvectors, i.e.
ρxE :=
3∑
i=0
Γ
(1)
i P
x
i , (C5)
where the eigenvalues {Γ(1)i } are
Γ
(1)
0 = Γ
(1)
2 = 0, (C6a)
Γ
(1)
1 = λ0 + λ1, (C6b)
Γ
(1)
3 = λ2 + λ3, (C6c)
and the operators {P xi } are projectors on the eigenspace
of the eigenvalues {Γ(1)i } obtained by diagonalizing ρxE .
From the diagonalization it is possible to derive explicitly
the projectors: 4
4 Let us define O2 as the 2x2 matrix with zero entries.
P 00=


λ1
λ0+λ1
−
√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1
−
√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1
λ0
λ0+λ1

⊕O2,P 01=


λ0
λ0+λ1
√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1
λ1
λ0+λ1

⊕O2
P 02=O2⊕


λ3
λ2+λ3
−
√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3
−
√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3
λ2
λ2+λ3

,P 03=O2⊕


λ2
λ2+λ3
√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3
λ3
λ2+λ3


P 10=


λ1
λ0+λ1
√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1
λ0
λ0+λ1

⊕O2,P 11=


λ0
λ0+λ1
−
√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1
−
√
λ0λ1
λ0+λ1
λ1
λ0+λ1

⊕O2
P 12=O2⊕


λ3
λ2+λ3
√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3
λ2
λ2+λ3

,P 13=O2⊕


λ2
λ2+λ3
−
√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3
−
√
λ2λ3
λ2+λ3
λ3
λ2+λ3

.
For the following, it is convenient to define
Pi :=
1
2
1∑
x=0
P xi , (C8)
with i = 0, 1, 2, 3. As can be easily verified the operators
{Pi} are diagonal in the basis where the operators {P xi }
assume the form given above.
Appendix D: Additional details of the proof of
Theorem IV.4
Before to start, it is necessary to fix the notation for
the involved operators. The operator ρ⊗nXE can be written
as
ρ⊗nXE =
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉 〈x| ⊗
22n−1∑
i=0
Γ
(n)
i P
(n)x
i , (D1)
where
P
(n)x
i :=
n−1⊗
p=0
P
xp
ip
, (D2)
Γ
(n)
i :=
n−1∏
p=0
Γ
(1)
ip
(D3)
and i :=
∑n−1
p=0 4
pip with ip = 0, ..., 3, x :=
∑n−1
p=0 2
pxp
where xp is a binary digit.
The operator ρ⊗nXE is constituted of 2
n diagonal blocks
labeled by the index x. Each of the blocks has 22n eigen-
values Γ
(n)
i and each eigenvalue is associated to a projec-
tor P
(n)x
i that depends on the eigenvalue (index ”i”) and
on the block (index ”x”).
1. Construction of the operator ηXnEn
The operator ηXnEn is constructed in such a way that
the inequalities in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) are satisfied.
For constructing ηXnEn we construct first ηEn using the
following two steps:
91. Find τXnEn such that S2(τXnEn) = S
ε−εˆ
2 (ρ
⊗n
XE)
2. Find ηXnEn such that S0(ηEn) = S
εˆ
0(τEn).
By definition of smooth Re´nyi entropy of order two
τXnEn ∈ B
ε−εˆ
2
cq
(
ρ⊗nXE
)
and it can be written as
τXnEn :=
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
|x〉 〈x| ⊗
22n−1∑
i=0
τ
(n)
i P
(n)x
i . (D4)
Regarding the operator ηEn , the constraint on its
Re´nyi entropy of order zero is only a constraint on its
eigenvalues. For assigning a well defined structure of op-
erator to ηXnEn we use τXnEn . Let Π be the projector
that cuts out the eigenvalues of τEn such that their sum
is εˆ/2.
The operator ηXnEn , is defined by
ηXnEn :=
1
1− εˆ2
(1lXn ⊗Π)τXnEn(1lXn ⊗Π). (D5)
This definition is such that ηEn =
1
1− εˆ
2
ΠτEnΠ has the
eigenvalues for respecting S0(ηEn) = S
εˆ
0(τEn).
Finally, note, that the construction above, although
arbitrary, is legitimate because, as it is easy to verify,
ηXnEn ∈ B
ε
2
cq
(
ρ⊗nXE
)
as required by the statement of The-
orem IV.4.
2. Proof of S0(ηEn) ≤ S
εˆ
0(ρ
⊗n
E
+ δ¯En)
In order to find the claimed bound, we need to find a
bound on the eigenvalues of the operator τEn . In order
to do that, we exploit the definition of τXnEn , ρ
⊗n
XE and
of modified smooth Re´nyi entropy of order two (Defin-
tion IV.2).
We introduce the operator δXnEn defined by
δXnEn := τXnEn − ρ⊗nXE . (D6)
Let δEn := trEn(δXnEn), τEn := trEn(τXnEn) and let
{|l〉} be a basis of eigenvectors of the operator τEn . The
eigenvalues of τEn are
〈l| τEn |l〉 := 〈l| ρ⊗nE |l〉+ 〈l| δEn |l〉 . (D7)
The operator ρ⊗nE is fully characterized by the protocol
[10]. In order to complete the proof, it remains to bound
〈l| δEn |l〉.
The following lemma permits to reduce the analysis to
the eigenvalues of δEn .
Lemma D.1. Let ρ⊗nXE , τXnEn be the operators described
by equation (D1) and (D4). Then
[τEn , ρ
⊗n
E ] = 0.
Proof. By definition
τEn =
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
22n−1∑
i=0
τ
(n)
i P
(n)x
i =
22n−1∑
i=0
τ
(n)
i
(
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
P
(n)x
i
)
.
Observe that the operator in the brackets is diagonal, in
fact:
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
P
(n)x
i =
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
n−1⊗
p=0
P
xp
ip
=
1
2n
1∑
x0=0
1∑
x1=0
...
1∑
xn−1=0
n−1⊗
p=0
P
xp
ip
=
n−1⊗
p=0
(
1
2
1∑
x=0
P xip
)
=
n−1⊗
p=0
Pip .
Due to the diagonality of the operators {Pip}ip=0,...,3 and
the fact that the tensor product of diagonal operators
lead to a diagonal operator, the assertion is proved.
The next lemma, permits to relate the operator δE to
the operators Pi defined in Eq. (C8).
Lemma D.2. It holds
δEn =
ε− εˆ
2m0
(
1l− (P1 + P3)⊗n
)
+
∑
i∈V
δiP
(n)
i ,
where the operators Pi are defined in Eq. (C8), P
(n)
i =⊗n−1
p=0 Pip and V := {i : Γ(n)i 6= 0}.
Proof. Using the eigenvalues in Eq. (17) and Eq. (D6),
Eq. (D4)
δEn := trXn(δXnEn)
=
ε− εˆ
2m0
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
∑
i∈V⊥
P
(n)x
i
+
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
∑
i∈V
δiP
(n)x
i .
The quantity
∑
i∈V⊥ P
(n)x
i is such that∑
i∈V⊥
P
(n)x
i = 1l−
∑
i∈V
P
(n)x
i .
From equation Eq. (D3) and Eq. (C6), we see that the
non-zero eigenvalues of ρ⊗nXE are characterized by the ab-
sence of the index ip = 0, 2. Therefore, it follows that
∑
i∈V
P
(n)x
i
(D2)
=
∑
i∈V
n−1⊗
p=0
P
xp
ip
=
n−1⊗
p=0
(
P
xp
1 + P
xp
3
)
.
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By taking the sum over all blocks and using the operator
defined in Eq. (C8) the statement of the lemma follows.
Using the previous lemma we can prove the most im-
portant result of this section.
Proposition D.3. For λ0 >
1
2 and λ1 = λ2 = λ3 the
following inequality holds:
〈l| δEn |l〉 ≤ ε− εˆ
2m0
(
1−
(
λ1
λ1 + λ0
)n)
, (D8)
where {|l〉} is a basis of eigenvectors for the operator ρ⊗nE .
Proof.
〈l| δEn |l〉 ≤ ε− εˆ
2m0
max
{|l〉}
〈l| (1l− (P1 + P3)⊗n) |l〉+
+
∑
i∈V
δi 〈l|P (n)i |l〉
=
ε− εˆ
2m0
(
1−
(
λ1
λ1 + λ0
)n)
+
+
∑
i∈V
δi 〈l|P (n)i |l〉 , (D9)
where V := {i : Γ(n)i 6= 0}. Since the δi are negative or
zero and the operators P
(n)
i are such that P
(n)
i ≥ 0, the
last term in Eq. (D9) is negative and then the proposition
follows.
Concluding, using Proposition D.3, it is possible to give
an upper bound for Sε0(τEn), in fact
〈l| τEn |l〉 = 〈l| ρ⊗nE |l〉+ 〈l| δEn |l〉
≤ 〈l| ρ⊗nE |l〉+
ε− εˆ
2m0
(
1−
(
λ1
λ1 + λ0
)n)
.
(D10)
Substituting in the formula above the actual values for
the symmetric six-state protocol provided in equation
(C1) the proof is concluded.
3. Proof of S2(ηXnEn) ≥ S
ε−εˆ
2 (ρ
⊗n
XE
)− εˆ
Using Eq. (D5), it follows that
S2(ηXnEn) = − log
[
trXnEn ((1l⊗Π)τXnEn(1l ⊗Π))2
]
+
+ 2 log
(
1− εˆ
2
)
.
Using the first requirement in Definition IV.2, the op-
erator τXnEn is of the form
τXnEn =
1
2n
2n−1⊕
x=0
τxEn .
We concentrate on the argument of the logarithm in
the first term on right-hand side of S2(τXnEn)
trXnEn
[
((1l ⊗Π)τXnEn(1l⊗Π))2
]
= trXnEn
[
2n−1⊕
x=0
(
1
2n
ΠτxEnΠ
)2]
= trEn
[
2n−1∑
x=0
(
1
2n
ΠτxEnΠ
)2]
=
2n−1∑
x=0
trEn
[(
1
2n
ΠτxEnΠ
)2]
≤
2n−1∑
x=0
trEn
[(
1
2n
τxEn
)2]
= trXnEn
[
(τXnEn)
2
]
Taking the first term of the Maclaurin expansion of
log(1− εˆ2 ) for εˆ small, we conclude that
S2(ηXnEn) ≥ S2(τXnEn)− εˆ.
Using Eq. (13) the proof is concluded.
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